


# NEWS BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELEASE



**Press Conference:**

**SECRETARY KISSINGER ON NUCLEAR  
ARMS CONTROL, SUMMIT**

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**June 24, 1974**

Press conference by Secretary of State  
Henry A. Kissinger in the International  
Conference Room of the Department  
of State, June 24, 1974.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I would begin with some observations on the forthcoming Summit before we go to your questions.

In many respects the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is the most crucial toward the maintenance of peace in the world. The United States and the Soviet Union are the only two countries that have the capability of a general nuclear war, and, therefore, the only countries that can end civilized life as we know it.

Moreover, the interests of the United States and of the Soviet Union intersect in many parts of the globe. There is, therefore, always a possibility that misunderstandings may lead to confrontation, and the confrontation could escalate into conflict.

A principal objective of the United States, therefore, has to be to make sure that relations between the United States are based on deliberate decisions and that misunderstanding is reduced to a minimum.

And secondly, to try to bring about a set of constructive and, where possible, cooperative relationships that give both sides an incentive in maintaining the peace.

This is the basic purpose of the Summit. The Summit will, therefore, have three principal parts:

One, a general exchange between the President and the Soviet leadership which will review the international situation, try to identify areas of possible disagreement, and attempt to minimize the consequences of these disagreements -- as well as to identify areas of possible cooperative action and work out the means of this cooperation.

Secondly, to deal with the most complex, and in many respects the most serious, problem of the modern period, which is the control of the nuclear arms race. Never before have political leaders had the capacity to destroy human life as a result of unilateral decision -- and to do it in a matter of days. Never before has technology been so at odds with the human capacity to comprehend it. Never before has technology developed a momentum of its own in such a manner that it becomes increasingly difficult to control it.

Our objectives with respect to the control of arms are as follows:

Obviously, neither side should have a military advantage as the result of any agreement that may be made.

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Secondly, neither side should be able to have a political advantage as a result of any agreements that might be made.

Thirdly, neither side should believe that such an advantage exists -- even if in reality it does not exist -- because the perception is more important in many respects than the reality.

And finally, neither side, no ally, nor other interested country of either side, should have such a perception.

To achieve this is very complicated because the forces of both sides have been developed on the basis of different principles. There are symmetries that were deliberately designed in the kind of forces both sides have built, in the way they are based, in the technology they represent.

But for the United States not to make a major effort in this field is something that no future generation could possibly understand, and the danger we see, and that we are trying to prevent, is to keep technology from driving policy, to prevent a situation from arising in which the inertia of technological decisions brings about a qualitative change -- first, in the nature of military, and secondly, in the nature of political, relations.

Secondly, this is not a minor decision to engage in an unrestricted arms race. Not only because of the military consequences of such an arms race, but also because the justifications that would have to be made on either side to sustain such an effort, might, in time, become incompatible with a policy of relaxation of tensions and might, in themselves, be a factor introducing confrontation.

I say this so that you understand what our motivations are and, of course, we recognize that serious people will differ with what weight is to be given to particular schemes. And of course, any agreement we would make would be submitted to full Congressional scrutiny.

But this is the area of our concern, and it is one in which we plan to have serious, extensive, and searching talks in the Soviet Union.

The third area with which we will deal in the Soviet Union is an attempt to give a more positive structure to our relationships. That is to say, as in every previous Summit we will discuss a series of cooperative arrangements in the fields of economics, scientific exchange, and other matters of mutual concern. The purpose of these agreements or arrangements or discussions or whatever the case may be, will be to draw both societies into a more civilized relationship; to give each side a stake in the maintenance of an orderly and increasingly humane international system; and thereby to contribute to the peace of the world.

This, then, is the purpose of the Summit:

- To maintain a dialogue;
- To contain the danger of nuclear confrontation; and
- To create positive incentives for a peaceful world.

And now, I will be delighted to take questions.

Q Mr. Secretary.

A Yes, sir.

Q With respect to the -- I think it was your second point, on the nuclear -- "To contain the danger of the nuclear confrontation" -- there has been a great deal of discussion, a good part of it uninformed, I think, about what agreements that you and Mr. Dobrynin may have made or not, which went beyond the '72 Moscow Agreement. As you said at another point, the perception of things is much more important, sometimes, psychologically, than the "things." Now I realize your spokesman has denied such an agreement. Can you put this thing simply, and bluntly, for us?

A I can put it bluntly. I don't think I can put it simply. (Laughter).

There have been two points made:

Point one is that as a result of a secret agreement between the Administration and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has been permitted to modernize 70 missiles on the G-Class submarines; and that therefore, the total number of modern submarine-launched missiles permitted to the Soviet Union is 1,020 and not 950 as the Administration has publicly stated and as was represented to Congress.

The second argument is that the Interim Agreement permits the United States to build 710 submarine-launched missiles but, in fact, the United States is intending to maintain only 656 submarine-launched missiles, and that therefore, the total for the United States is 54 less than has been represented to the Congress and to the public. So that the total change in the Soviet Union's favor is of 124 missiles -- brought about as the result of secret agreements made between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Those arguments are totally false in every detail. They have no merit whatsoever, and I shall now explain why.

First, let me deal with the G-Class submarine:

At the time the Interim Agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was permitted a total of 950 modern ballistic missiles on nuclear submarines. That figure of 950 was to be achieved by -- or it could be achieved only by -- the replacement of older Soviet missiles for any modern missile that was deployed on submarines beyond the figure of 740.

In other words, the Soviet Union would have to retire 210 older missiles in order to reach the total of 950.

This raised the issue of what missiles the Soviet Union would have to retire in order to reach the permitted total of 950.

The United States had an interest that the 210 missiles that would be retired would be ICBMs -- missiles of a range of 5,000 miles and of warheads in the six megaton range -- that is to say, the SS-7 and SS-8 missiles.

We wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from trading in obsolescent missiles that in our judgment they would have to retire anyway -- namely, the missiles that are on the G-Class submarines.

On the G-Class submarine, the Soviet Union possesses, we believe, 20 operational ones. Eleven of them have missiles of a range of 700 miles and nine have missiles of a range of 300 miles. No G-Class submarine has been on station off the Atlantic coast of the United States since 1967; and no G-Class submarine has been on station off the Pacific coast of the United States since 1969. The G-Class submarine is a diesel-powered submarine that can stay under water for only 2-3 days, that is extremely noisy and, therefore, extremely vulnerable. And moreover, the 300-mile range missile which is, as I pointed out, on 9 of these submarines, can be fired only if the submarine surfaces -- it cannot be fired from under water.

Therefore, it seemed to us extremely improbable that the Soviet Union would maintain in its force a weapon -- which it would have to carry 4,000 miles -- so that it could fire it the remaining 300 miles, when it already possessed 1,400 weapons that it could fire from the Soviet Union, and when it was building 950 weapons that it could fire over a range of 1,500 miles.

We wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from trading in a weapon which we were certain they would have to retire, in any event, for a modern weapon. Or to put it another way, we wanted the Soviet Union to trade in ICBMs for the modern weapon. And frankly, we considered it a negotiating achievement when in Moscow the Soviet Union agreed that the replacement for the 210 modern submarine missiles could not come from the G-Class submarines but would have to come either from the ICBMs or from other more modern forces that were built after 1965.

In my press conference on the night of May 26 to May 27, I explained this provision in great detail. I stated specifically -- and if I may spend a minute in reading it to you -- I was asked: "How about the G-Class?" My answer was: "If they are modernized they are counted against the 950. They do not have to retire them. They do have to retire the H-Class submarines if they want to go up to 950. They do not have to retire the G-Class submarines, but if they modernize them they are counted against the 950.

"In other words, the Soviet Union had two choices. If they kept the G-Class submarine in their force, they had that option. But if they put a modern missile on the old submarine, it would be counted in the 950. But they could not retire the obsolescent missiles on the G-Class and trade them in for modern missiles."

So this is what I said on May 26. On June 5, there was a meeting of the Verification Panel -- on which all agencies were represented -- in which this provision was fully explained and received the unanimous support of those present. The only requirement that was made was to make sure we would tie down the Soviet Union by means of an interpretive statement to a provision which we considered entirely in our interest.

On June 5, I sent the following guidance to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will now read this. It says:

"Enclosed for your use in the coming SALT hearings is the interpretation of the offensive agreement with regard to the SLBM limitations and replacement provisions. You should follow this guidance in preparing testimony and in responding to questions."

I will now read from this guidance: "To reach 950 SLBMs on Y-Class submarines will require the Soviets to retire H-Class launchers. They will also have to retire SS-7 and -8 ICBMs. They cannot build launchers on Y-Class boats to replace launchers on G-Class boats unless the launchers on such boats have been deployed with modern SLBMs. G-Class boats are outside the agreement unless they are modernized by equipping them with modern SLBM launchers. Any modern SLBM, that is, submarine-launched ballistic missile, operationally deployed on G-Class will be counted within the 950 ceiling and above the 740 base line and must be accompanied by corresponding destruction or dismantling of SS-7's and -8's or older nuclear-powered submarines."

It is obvious our concern was to make sure that the ICBMs with the large war-heads would be dismantled.

This was the guidance we gave to the bureaucracy and which we asked them to tell Congressional committees. This was also what Ambassador Smith testified before the Jackson Subcommittee in July 1972. When, in carrying out the understanding with the Verification Panel that we would give an interpretive statement to the Soviet Union of what I had already said in the press conference -- namely, that G-Class boats would count only if modern missiles were put on them or, conversely, that they could not trade in G-Class missiles for modern launchers -- when we handed this interpretive statement to the Soviet Union, they disputed our interpretation and insisted that they should have the right to trade in these obsolescent missiles for new missiles.

This led to a month of exchanges between us and the Soviet Union, and it then seemed to us that since it was an election year, since there might be a change in administration, and since there could be a change of personnel even if there was no change of administration, that our successors should not find themselves in the same position as we did and that they should not have to go through the record and reconstruct the understanding. And, therefore, we asked the Soviet Ambassador to sign the interpretive statement that we had made -- which I will now read -- and which is almost verbatim what I had already said publicly in the press conference on May 26, the night the agreement was signed, and which we had, moreover, told every agency of the Government should be our public position.

Let me read this so-called understanding which has been so much in the press: "In clarification of interpretation of the provisions of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms signed on May 26, the United States understands that: One, the aggregate level of ballistic missile launchers on submarines established by the protocol for the United States and the USSR - 950 for the USSR and 710 for the United States - includes ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines." There is, therefore, no basis whatever for saying that we authorized the modernization of missiles on diesel-powered submarines.

"Secondly, launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines are not included in the above-mentioned levels and, therefore, cannot be used for purposes of replacement as defined in the protocol." In other words, they had to get rid of ICBMs.

"Three, a modern ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines commissioned in the USSR since 1965. The Soviet side has indicated its agreement with this interpretation."

In other words, the so-called secret agreement is nothing other than a statement by the United States of what we had already stated publicly on May 26, of what we had told our bureaucracy on June 5, of what we had sent out in guidance to every agency on June 15. It does not permit the Soviet Union to build one additional modern ballistic missile on submarines above the level of 950 that we agreed upon. And, therefore, the figure given publicly and before Congressional committees is correct. And what we are dealing with here is an attempt to tie down a provision of the agreement that was considered to the advantage of the United States -- serving our purposes that we insisted on -- and that the Soviet Union resisted in putting into this form for six weeks.

Now, let me turn to the second point:

The fact that the United States, again allegedly as a result of a secret understanding, agreed not to build up to the total permitted level of 710 submarine-launched missiles on submarines.

For this I have to explain the submarine issue.

Before going to Moscow - indeed before agreeing to specifying any submarine levels - at the request of the President I consulted both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to our building programs. Both told me that they did not wish to build additional submarines, missile-carrying submarines, of the type that it was then possible to build - substantially the existing POSEIDON boats. And that they preferred to wait with the building of new submarines until what was then called ULMS, and is now called TRIDENT, would be operational after 1977.

Therefore, we knew that we had no intention of building any additional submarines until after the expiration of the Interim Agreement. Nevertheless, we put into the Interim Agreement a provision according to which we could convert 54 of our older ICBMs to submarine-launched missiles. We put it into the Interim Agreement, quite frankly, for the third and fourth reasons which I gave with respect to our general strategic policy -- the perception of other countries of the American position.

We did not think it was desirable to put into an agreement a Soviet right to convert old missiles into submarine-launched missiles without maintaining an American

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right to convert old missiles into submarine-launched missiles. And therefore, to maintain the formal symmetry of the agreement, we put into the agreement a right which we had no intention to exercise.

Since we knew that upon return to the United States we would testify on behalf of the TRIDENT -- what is now called the TRIDENT program -- since while we were in Moscow, there had been articles in our newspapers about the possibility that the United States might launch a big program for TRIDENT boats, the President thought it desirable that on the last day of the Summit Conference of 1972 to tell the Soviet Union what would become apparent within a matter of weeks anyway -- namely, that we had no intention of exercising the conversion right from TITAN missiles to submarines during the period of the Interim Agreement.

This again did not change the total figures.

We testified that the United States was entitled to have 1,710 missiles. It did not -- I repeat -- change the total figure. It meant that we would maintain 1,054 ICBMs and 656 submarine missiles.

This was not a concession the United States made to the Soviet Union. It was a relatively minor gesture designed to retain general confidence.

When I testified on June 15th -- it wasn't called testimony then, because I was Assistant to the President -- when I spoke to the assembled Congressional leaders in the East Room of the White House on June 15th, explaining our program, I said -- and I quote -- "The Interim Agreement will not prohibit the United States from continuing current and planned strategic offensive programs, since neither the multiple warhead conversion nor the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze, and since the ULMS -- that is, what is now called TRIDENT -- submarine system is not, nor never was, planned for deployment until after 1977."

In every 5-year projection which we have submitted to the Congress, we have shown that we planned on 41 boats and 1,054 missiles.

To sum up -- the totals for the Soviet side which were submitted to the Congress, and which were publicly stated, have not been changed by any agreement, understanding or clarification -- public or private. The totals for the United States that were submitted to the Congress and stated publicly have not been altered by any agreement or understanding -- public or private. The figures are exactly those that have been represented -- exactly those that have been agreed to -- and all of the disputes arise over esoteric aspects of replacement provisions, and not about the substance of the agreement.

I'm sorry I made such a long answer.

Q One loose end. You presented your interpretation to the Russians. They resisted it. I assume they finally signed it.

A They signed it, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, perhaps another loose end. This interpretative statement on the Soviet sea missiles -- to what extent was Congress informed of this interpretative statement? And, secondly, if I may, why in your judgment is this becoming a matter of dispute?

A The interpretative statement as such was not submitted to the Congress, but the interpretation was submitted to the Congress. The interpretative statement was not submitted because it was in the channel of the General Secretary to the President, and because there was some question about whether it really was proper to make the Soviet Union sign an American interpretation -- involving the general question of faith.

I think, however, that that sort of issue, whether that sort of statement should be submitted, is easily soluble -- and we will not insist on retaining it within Presidential channels.

The major point is, however, that the substance of it -- the fact of our interpretation, and the fact that we would act accordingly -- was submitted to the Congress both in public statement

Why is this becoming an issue now? I can only assume that there was a misunderstanding on the part of some of the witnesses, or on the part of some of the Senators who heard testimony about what they were being told.

Q May I follow on that? I wonder if you saw in it any effort to harass you or harass the team this close to the Summit? Is this coming from the same sort of people who have doubts about going to the Summit on SALT now?

A I don't really want to speculate about motives. I think it is important that on issues of such importance, that we can discuss them calmly and in the long-term national interest, and I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those who made these charges.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have asked that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reopen its inquiry into your role in the 1969-71 wiretaps, and you have offered documents from your office in support of the vindication that you seek.

What will these documents prove, and isn't it true that the Justice Department documents are so ambiguous that they alone can't ever fully resolve the issue? And, further, have you asked President Nixon or General Haig, or will you ask them, to publicly explain the taped Nixon statement that you asked for the taps, and that he assumed that they had been done?

A I have asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to reopen the hearings because -- or to reopen its inquiry -- because of my firm conviction that it is not possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States while the moral fitness of the Secretary of State is in question.

I have therefore asked Mr. Maw, the head of the Legal Office of the State Department, to work with the Justice Department to make certain that every relevant document is put before the Committee, either from Departmental files or from my own files. And nothing will be held back that I have any control over.

I do not think it would be appropriate for me to make any comment about an expected outcome. But I hope very much that the Committee will look both into this, as well as into the charges with respect to the "Plumbers" that keep coming up from time to time -- in which, however, there is no documentary evidence of any kind that I have been able to find. And I will leave it up to the Committee to decide where the evidence leads.

With respect to the President, I believe he has stated his relationship to this issue in the statement of May 22, 1973, but I, as I pointed out before, am anxious for all the relevant facts to be put before the Committee.

Q Have you asked the President to clear up that one garbled sentence that seems to say he assumed that you had asked for something, and that it was done?

A I have not made a formal request to the President to that effect, no.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you feel handicapped under the circumstances, relative to that question, in going to Moscow now? I mean, in your conduct of foreign affairs at this time?

A I am confident that when all the facts are examined by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that their conclusions are likely to be the same as they were last year, since, after all, last year they had before them Justice Department and FBI summaries of the total evidence. As far as I know, there is no substantially new information, but I may be wrong.

Q Mr. Secretary, doesn't the dispute that you have just addressed yourself to at considerable length concerning the 124 missiles, and the fact that the President will be going to Moscow with the impeachment challenge hanging over him -- doesn't that raise a strong likelihood that anything agreed on the nuclear field in Moscow will likely be highly contentious in the United States; and, if so, how do you intend to deal with this problem?

A The urgency of dealing with the nuclear problem is produced by the pace of technology. Time and again, in the nuclear period the pace of technology has outstripped the capacity of man to deal with it.

With respect to several aspects of the current nuclear arms race, there is a very definite tim

What we will do is to negotiate according to our best conception of the national interest. It is clear that any agreement that may be made will be subject to a rather contentious debate. This debate is, in any event, apparently unavoidable. And we can only hope that it will be conducted with realization on both sides that it involves fundamental questions of national survival and the future of humanity; that the good faith of the participants on either side is not at issue. And on that basis, I think such a debate would contribute to the national understanding.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions on SALT. The first one concerns your reading of the memo of understanding with Ambassador Dobrynin. If I heard your Point Three right, you said that a modern missile is defined as a missile on a submarine of the type deployed on a nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in the USSR since 1965. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Well, if that is so, the nuclear-powered submarine is not a diesel submarine.

A That is right.

Q Is it not so that if the Soviets chose to develop a missile not commissioned since 1965, not deployed on either the DELTA Class or the YANKEE class submarine, but if they were willing to go to that expense, they could have added 70 modern missiles to the old diesel submarines?

A No, because it was also made clear that if a modern missile is put on the G-Class submarine, that then it will be counted in the total of 950.

Q But that is not clear by the definition of these modern missile submarines. Because it says in effect that it is not commissioned since '65. If they are willing to develop a variation, they can put 70 new ones in, as long as it is not the same as is already in there.

A Well, in the context of all the exchanges that have taken place, in the context of all of our public statements, this is a sort of legalism that would be totally rejected by the United States.

First of all, it is an absurdity to assume that the Soviet Union would develop a special missile for a submarine that is in itself obsolescent.

Secondly, in the context of all of the exchanges that have taken place, it is perfectly clear that if a modern missile is put on a G-Class submarine, we will insist on counting it as part of the 950. And while perhaps this hair-splitting interpretation is possible, it is totally inconsistent with the negotiating record -- it is totally inconsistent with all the exchanges that took place previously. It would be absolutely rejected by the United States.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A There is, moreover, no evidence whatsoever that any such missile is being developed and deployed by the Soviet Union on any vehicle, let alone on the G-Class submarine.

Q Mr. Secretary, as you go off to Moscow, does the U.S. Government now have a unified position regarding the SALT negotiation?

A We do not have before us a Soviet proposal which requires a formal American position. We have a general agreement on the philosophy of our approach. I do not doubt that if we wanted to translate this philosophy into numbers that disagreements would emerge. But this is not the issue we now face. And, in any event, it is the responsibility of the President, which I don't doubt he will exercise, to resolve disagreements if disagreements should still exist if we ever do arrive at numbers.

Q Is it likely that you would then come up with some kind of SALT agreement



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during the Summit meeting?

A I do not expect that we will get a completed SALT agreement at the Summit. But you can't exclude the possibility of substantial progress.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you address yourself to the underground threshold test ban probability, sir?

A We are, as has been publicly stated, discussing at this time the feasibility, not of a complete underground test ban, but of an underground test ban at a certain threshold. There are discussions among experts to determine the level at which such a threshold should be put; the kinds of verification that would be desirable; and the time at which such a test ban should go into effect, all of which will, of course, affect the strategic calculations and positions of both sides.

We think that progress in this field is possible.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you explain why the President felt compelled, on the last day of the Summit, to tell the Soviet leaders that we did not intend to build up to the 710 level? I think you explained it by saying that it would become apparent anyway. Why would it become apparent?

A Mr. Lisagor, let's be precise what the President said. The President said we would not trade in the 54 TITANS for three submarines. The President's statement did not in any way change the totals. The U.S. totals were set at 1,710 which at that time stood at 1,054 land-based missiles and 656 sea-based missiles. What the President said was that he had no plans to convert the 54 TITANS into submarine-based missiles. There was no change in the total numbers. That is the first thing to keep in mind.

Second, he did this because it would become apparent within a matter of weeks, as indeed it did become apparent in a matter of weeks, that an impetus would be given to a program which was then called ULMS and is now called TRIDENT. And we did not want to emerge from a SALT agreement with what might look like a big, new program of strategic submarines. And it would become apparent to the Soviet Union very quickly, in any event, what the operational date of these new submarines would be. And therefore he pointed out that none of these TRIDENT boats would become operational during the period of the agreement, and that therefore the conversion option would almost certainly not be exercised.

I might point out that I foreshadowed this, that I made this clear in my statement before the Congressional group when I said that none of these boats would become operational until after 1977. And it has been part of every Defense Department statement since then.

It was a gesture that was of no great significance, that leaders sometimes engage in for the general atmosphere of relationships.

Q Mr. Secretary, on that gesture that the President made, if the Interim Agreement were extended, as has been suggested, either at this Summit or sometime in the near future, would the United States be bound by that statement of the President's?

And while I have the floor -- Defense Minister Peres is here and there has been talk from Israel of a request for \$1.5 billion a year in military aid for a multi-year arms program. Does the United States have an intention of giving arms at that magnitude?

A First, with respect to the extension of the Interim Agreement. If the Interim Agreement were extended, this statement of the United States plans, which is all it was -- it was not a commitment -- it was a statement of what the United States planned to do identical to what we stated in every defense budget -- it was not a world-shaking event. That statement would obviously not be necessarily binding. And how we would handle the extension of an Interim Agreement would depend entirely on the terms that other provisions which would lead us to an extension of the Interim Agreement provided. In any event, this particular assurance was an assurance with respect to American plans as they then stood. It would not necessarily continue if there were an extension of the Interim Agreement.

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With respect to the visit of Defense Minister Peres, I have stated on occasion before Congressional committees, that the United States is prepared to discuss a longer-term arrangement. The visit of the Defense Minister is designed to begin such a discussion. It is not related to any particular level.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A This gentleman was interrupted before.

Q Mr. Secretary, the People's Republic of China is also a nuclear power. There have been reports of late that the pace of normalization between the United States and Peking has been slowing down. Would you give your assessment of that? And also whether you plan to visit there. And if so, if the nuclear question will be discussed.

A We do not believe that the pace of normalization is slowing down from the general trend that had been established. Obviously, in the first year, when a radical change in our relationship occurred, it was more dramatic than it has been since. But I believe that both sides continue to be committed to the general course that we have been pursuing.

I have no immediate plan to visit the People's Republic of China. But I have been visiting there about once a year. So it cannot be excluded. What I will discuss on a visit that has not yet been decided, I think we should leave for a little later.

Q Mr. Secretary, are the Israeli raids on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon the kind of activity for which the United States promised diplomatic support, or at least non-interference? And have you urged restraint on the Israelis in connection with the raids? And do you see them as possibly endangering the disengagement agreements?

A The United States statement was related to the Syrian disengagement plan. And we make our decision with respect to what stands we will take in each case.

Q Mr. Secretary, Mr. Brezhnev has made some encouraging statements about the chances of MBFR. Can you say anything about the prospects at the Moscow talks? And secondly, can you say anything about your travel plans after Moscow and in the following weeks?

A The statements of the General Secretary have been of a very general nature. Right now, in the MBFR discussions in Vienna, each side is putting before the other a rather full exposition of its point of view. The issues are extremely complicated because of the different natures of the force structures on both sides, and because of the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact in the area that is under negotiation.

The Soviet Union has not put before us any scheme other than the one that is being negotiated in Vienna. Therefore we would have no basis for making any other decisions as of now than the decisions that are now being discussed in Vienna.

If the Soviet leaders were to put before us a different proposition than the one that now exists in Vienna, we would obviously have to discuss it with our NATO allies, since this is not a bilateral negotiation. We would hope that they would.

Q Mr. Secretary, earlier this year, on January 10, 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced a decision which had been made to effect certain changes in the American strategic nuclear targeting doctrine to facilitate flexibility in nuclear responses. Was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee consulted before this decision was made?

A I don't believe that it is necessary for the Secretary of Defense to consult the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about American strategic doctrine. However, I have had several sessions with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the relationship between American strategic doctrine and the conduct of foreign policy. And I plan, after my return, to have a meeting with the Muskie Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the relationship between American strategic doctrine and the conduct of foreign policy.

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Q Mr. Secretary, in the context of your confirmation hearings, there were sort of assurances traded back and forth about prior consultation, and it seems like this matter is something that would seriously affect our foreign relations.

A I believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been fully consulted before any major decision in foreign policy has been taken, and I think has had fuller discussions with me on strategic doctrine than has ever been the case.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there any possibility that the Cuban situation will appear in the Summit meeting in Moscow? and second, please, did you have any talk with Mr. Rabasa in your last meeting in Washington about Cuba?

A I see no possibility of Cuba arising at the Summit and there is no possibility of talking to Foreign Minister Rabasa without Cuba coming up.

(Laughter)

Q Mr. Secretary, I just want to pin down -- do you expect that there will be an agreement announced at the Summit on underground nuclear testing? Secondly, what is the likelihood of a limited agreement on SALT pertaining to limitations of MIRV? And thirdly, as you know, the mood of Congress toward economic agreements with the Soviet Union is rather lukewarm, to say the best. There have been reports that the administration has worked out with the Soviet Union a 10-year trade agreement. Is this so? and what else can you tell us about the trade package?

A With respect to the limited underground test ban, it is difficult to predict what will come out of the Summit because the experts' talks are still going on.

I think it is possible that there could be an agreement in principle, and an agreement on some of the criteria that will be used in the follow-on negotiations, and an agreement on certain levels like thresholds. I say it is possible. It is not certain.

The details of verification, exchange of information of geological data and so forth, would have to be worked out at a subsequent meeting.

With respect to SALT, in March when I was there, the Soviet Union made a proposal which in concept was worth looking at, though its numbers have not proved acceptable to us.

Now, I think it is imperative that the strategic situation be fully reviewed by Mr. Brezhnev and the President. Whether on the basis of this review they feel capable of giving detailed instructions to their negotiating teams, or whether they will feel that further exchanges are necessary before detailed instructions can be given to their negotiating teams, cannot be decided until these talks have taken place.

Was there a third part to your question?

Q On the economics --

A Oh -- on the economic agreements. There is a possibility of an economic agreement that does not require the expenditure of public funds, but would rather reflect an exchange of information and the facilitating of economic exchanges and, therefore, would not require the appropriation of public funds.

Our problem is that we have to continue the course which we believe is in the interests of world peace, subject to the fullest consultation with Congress, and to engage in the fullest public debate. But it is not a trivial matter whether, on the one hand, the arms race is continued without restriction with all the justifications that that will entail; and secondly, whether every positive incentive for restrained conduct is systematically closed off. And that cannot be analyzed simply in terms of one or two situations, but in terms of the ability and willingness of the United States and our allies to sustain it over the decade or so of confrontations which such a course would entail.

So, as a responsible administration, as the administration responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, we must continue on our best judgement which we will put fully before the committees of Congress. I understand that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is starting at the end of July a full set of public hearings on the direction of East-West relations, a course of action which I strongly support. And we will put the basic direction of our policy before the public for full discussion.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A Mr. Toth.

Q Mr. Secretary, as far as the partial underground test ban is concerned, what will be the practical consequences of it in terms of the technological advances we have been talking of -- what kind of testing would it preclude, in terms of MIRV, for example?

A What it would preclude is the testing of higher-yield weapons. And it would probably not affect the current generation of MIRVs, but it would affect the next generation of MIRVs. And it would make more difficult the combination of improved accuracies and larger yields which may again bring about a situation in which a premium will be put on a first strike. And I want to emphasize that many of the proposals that are being made to improve the strategic capability improve first-strike capabilities and do not improve the vulnerability of the weapons concerned -- and it has always been understood that the greatest danger to stability is a growing gap between first-and second-strike capabilities. So this would have a somewhat inhibiting effect on larger yields in the next generation of MIRVs.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A You go right ahead.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the present Soviet position is on Jewish emigration?

A The question of Jewish emigration is a very delicate and sensitive subject in which we have taken the position that we would pursue our dialogue in a way that, in our judgment, is most likely to bring about the result without putting it into a precise legal form. I have obviously been in discussion with Soviet leaders on that subject. And I have also discussed it at considerable length with Senators Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff. I believe that to publish the results of these discussions would defeat the purpose we are trying to achieve. Therefore, my reluctance to discuss it publicly is not a proclivity for secret negotiations but a desire to bring about a result in which I think there is no disagreement between the Senators and ourselves.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what is the range of threshold that is now under consideration by both sides -- this is for a partial underground test ban pact?

A I can't discuss that, because that is still subject to negotiation. But obviously the threshold has to be sufficiently low so that with expected uncertainties of verification it doesn't turn simply into a cosmetic exercise. If the threshold is put at a very high level, and since the uncertainties are a percentage of the level, then the basic objective of preventing the further elaboration of high-yield weapons cannot be achieved.

Q Mr. Secretary, during your series of visits in Western Europe after the Summit, will you be discussing the possibility of another trip to Europe by the President this year?

A That is not on the agenda. The basic purpose is first, to brief our allies on the results of the Summit; secondly, to discuss with our Allies the next phase of North Atlantic policy in the light of the North Atlantic Declaration and in the light of the changes of government that have occurred in the governments of so many of our allies. In other words, it is part of our continuing attempt to define the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Q Mr. Secretary, bearing in mind what happened in India, what new gimmick can the United States have to really assure that the Egyptian reactor will not eventually help Egypt produce a bomb, and has the United States not opened now the door for

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another nuclear power to give a nuclear reactor to some other Arab countries without the guarantees that you will be asking?

A First, the nuclear agreement that is being made with Egypt is also being made with Israel. Secondly, the diversion of material in India occurred in a reactor that did not have even the IAEA safeguards. Thirdly, we propose to negotiate, with respect to both of the reactors that are being sold, additional safeguards with respect to the storing and disposition of the end product of these reactors that we believe are substantially foolproof. Fourth, the discussion has tended to be in terms of whether the United States opened the door to the spread of nuclear technology in the Middle East. There is no reason to suppose that other countries, and not only those of Eastern Europe, would have been quite prepared to engage in nuclear discussions on peaceful energy with Egypt, or perhaps even other countries of the Middle East. And finally, our decision must be seen not only in the context of the particular technology, but in terms of the 6- to 8-year period of construction that would be involved, and the incentives that it would provide, at least during that period, for moderate behavior and constructive action.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A Over here.

Q Mr. Secretary, another question on the SALT.

Since they did come at a particularly delicate political time, it is important to tie it down.

You say that Point 3 of the agreement that you reached with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that could be interpreted to give the Soviets an additional 70 modern launchers was a mere legalism.

Did the Soviets consider it a mere legalism? Was their interpretation the same as yours? And did members of the U.S. delegation also consider it a mere legalism, not subject to Soviet interpretation? And finally, was this matter all settled at the time that you reached this interpretative agreement with Ambassador Dobrynin?

A I will have to look at this third point again -- to look at this particular super-legal interpretation. And I really would wonder whether it can be in the United States' interest to find legalistic loopholes for the Soviet Union that have never been raised in any discussion, that from the context of all previous exchanges could not possibly have been the United States' intention, and which would be totally rejected by us were the Soviet Union ever to raise such an issue.

The only purpose of our discussions with the Soviet Union on this problem was to tie down the understanding achieved in Moscow, made public in Moscow the night of the agreement, distributed to our bureaucracy on June 15, discussed in the Verification Panel, and repeated in every exchange with the Soviet Union.

The only purpose of it was that they could not trade in the G-Class missiles for modern submarine-launched missiles; in other words, to make sure that they would retire ICBMs.

If the Soviet Union were to develop an entirely new missile, not seen on any existing submarine, and put them on diesel-powered submarines, this would be such a gross violation of every previous exchange we have had with them, such a total lack of good faith, that they could not hide behind a super-clever interpretation of a clause that was intended only to tie them to a previous one. And I may say never has the Soviet Union made such a suggestion. And it would be absurd for the Soviet Union to develop a missile for a submarine that is in itself obsolescent. First of all, there are only 60, not 70 missiles. That is another inaccuracy that I didn't want to get into. But for the Soviet Union to go through the enormous expense of developing 60 special missiles, when they already possess 2400 long-range missiles, is so absurd a proposition that I must say that it had never occurred to us. And this particular clause in the interpretive statement, even if a lawyer could find that it could be interpreted that way, would be totally rejected by the U.S. Government. Nor has it ever been raised by the Soviet Union. Nor, am I confident, will it ever be raised by the Soviet Union.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.